Has the war between Israel and the Lebanese Hezbollah erupted? Or does it remain, as many observers in Israel perceive, at a boiling point—teetering on the threshold of a comprehensive conflict? This tension serves to exert maximum pressure on Hezbollah, compelling them to accept Israel's terms for a settlement that resembles surrender rather than engaging in a war from a position of weakness, metaphorically described as fighting from a "wheelchair."
In contrast, Hezbollah's rhetoric continues to frame their actions as supportive of the Gaza Strip, followed by vows of revenge and retaliation for their fallen leaders. They portray their stance as purely reactive. However, the indicators of the confrontation between Israel and Hezbollah suggest a different reality, one that contradicts Hezbollah's narrative. What has emerged is a distinct conflict, diverging in its pattern, prelude, and the very nature of the confrontation.
In the ongoing debate between recognizing a state of war or escalating to the highest level, comparing the current conflict to previous wars, particularly the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war, is fraught with mathematical errors. This tendency to measure performance and results against historical conflicts fails to account for crucial differences. The present conflict, which began with Operation "Noah's Flood," has been followed by nearly a year of war of attrition. Moreover, considering the time gap of almost two decades, there have been significant advancements in generations of wars, weapons, tactics, infrastructure, and all means of warfare now known as "fifth generation wars."
Consequently, it is important to understand that this war need not necessarily commence with the traditional image of Merkava tanks rolling down a long road to Beirut. Furthermore, expecting both parties to halt the current war or round of escalation based on a return to implementing Resolution 1701, which concluded the 2006 war, is overly simplistic. Such an outcome would require a complex and nuanced political negotiation process, taking into account the evolved nature of modern warfare and the current geopolitical landscape.
A Change in Confrontation
The latest stage in the ongoing conflict between Israel and Lebanese Hezbollah reflects a shift in the patterns of military engagement, primarily on Israel's part, while Hezbollah maintains its established approach to confrontation strategy. This disparity in adaptation highlights Hezbollah's current state of decline, as the organization struggles to adjust to changes or innovate new response methods. This inability to adapt is particularly significant given that one of the outcomes of the evolving confrontation is the varying effectiveness of military capabilities.
In this context, several indicators demonstrate the changing nature of the Israel-Hezbollah conflict:
1- Striking Hezbollah's command and control system:
This is evident in Israel's targeting of Hezbollah's organizational structure from leadership to base, aiming to induce paralysis and imbalance. A prime example is the attack on Hezbollah's internal communications network, which crippled a crucial logistical component responsible for transmitting orders from leadership to ground forces. Through a single, strategic strike, Israel achieved multiple objectives. The operation exploited an intelligence breach, impacting a wide range of intermediate-level bases and leadership positions within Hezbollah. This action not only disrupted the organization's communication capabilities but also served as a form of psychological warfare, aimed at demoralizing Hezbollah's base and supporters. Furthermore, the strike had the effect of eroding confidence in the organization itself, potentially weakening its internal structure and external support.
This multifaceted attack has severely damaged the circle of trust in Hezbollah's leadership, fueling accusations of sensitive information leaks and exposing the group's inability to engage in advanced confrontations or match Israel's penetration capabilities. This stark reality contrasts sharply with Hezbollah's purported advancements in this domain.
Another critical aspect of Israel's strategy involves selective, high-quality strikes targeting key figures in Hezbollah's decision-making and field leadership circles. These precision attacks leave the political echelon in disarray, unable to effectively control military leadership. Israeli military officials have confirmed their goal of depleting Hezbollah's leadership, both to weaken the organization and as a retaliatory measure. Defense Minister Yoav Galant's statement following the assassination of senior military commander Ibrahim Aqil underscores this approach, framing it as a personal reckoning with Hezbollah.
A pivotal element in this targeting process is the focus on disrupting the "ring of escalation of substitutes." This is exemplified by the assassination of Radwan Battalion commander Fouad Shukr approximately two months before his successor, Ibrahim Aqil, met the same fate. Concurrently, leaders of primary formations, such as axis and battalion commanders, are being systematically eliminated. This selective assassination strategy has significantly impaired Hezbollah's decision-making apparatus. Despite the existence of a command structure, the continuous elimination of key links in the chain of command has rendered a smooth, hierarchical process increasingly untenable.
2- Arithmetic errors in measurement and the "pattern variable":
Measuring preparedness for war against the 2006 conflict or other previous wars is neither necessary nor always possible. This difficulty extends even to comparisons with the one-year period of attrition between Israel and Hezbollah since October 8, 2023. Each war possesses unique characteristics, making direct comparisons challenging.
As previously noted, a selective pattern emerged in strikes against Hezbollah's upper military leadership. This operation reflected an advanced level of "shadow warfare," targeting leaders largely unknown both within Hezbollah's wider circle and the Lebanese public sphere. Interestingly, most of these individuals were on the United States' wanted list due to operations against the American embassy and forces in the 1980s. The recent events have brought these faces into the spotlight, coupled with the exposure of the middle circle in the "Pager and Walkie Talkie" operation.
Consequently, several variable approaches to war preparation or pressure for surrender emerged, diverging from the 2006 strategy of deploying Israeli tanks for ground warfare. By current logic and quantitative results, the impact of one week's confrontation—from the communications system hack to Aqil's assassination—surpassed that of the entire five-week 2006 war.
One crucial lesson learned relates to the balance of power. Contrary to expectations of relying solely on air force to prepare for ground war, the series of confrontations revealed a more diverse strategy. Israel's strike on Hezbollah's internal communications network underscores the significance of logistical capabilities in power balance calculations, with intelligence battles clearly favoring Israel.
In contrast, Hezbollah focused on horizontal capability development, enhancing missile and drone capabilities to penetrate Israeli defense systems. Despite the rapidly changing nomenclature of Hezbollah's missiles, this represents development in a singular direction. Consequently, Israel identified and exploited gaps in Hezbollah's main capabilities, leveraging its strengths in penetration and delivering qualitative strikes.
It is important to note Israel's shift towards engaging in prolonged conflicts. Betting on factors such as attrition, military mobilization challenges, multi-front movements, or internal political-military disagreements in Israel may prove misguided. Instead, Israel has achieved a degree of "strategic turning" that Hezbollah seemingly failed to anticipate. This oversight might stem from an unclear time interval, errors in estimates and decisions, or the existence of numerous constraints from which Hezbollah cannot break free.
Suboptimal Timing
The Israeli attack plan's timing appears unfavorable for Hezbollah, considering Iran's pursuit of an American deal. Consequently, Hezbollah finds itself constrained by Iranian strategic calculations. This is evidenced by Esmail Qaani's recent communications in Baghdad, where the Iranian Quds Force commander reportedly focused on reconciling internal conflicts between agents and Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani. While Iraqi factions aligned with Iran have made symbolic gestures, such as the September 25 drone attack on the Israeli port of Eilat, these actions remain largely perfunctory. It's plausible that each Israeli strike against Hezbollah serves as a message to Tehran, particularly as Iran grapples with communication device hacking. Conversely, Israel enjoys greater freedom from American pressure and benefits from assured support, allowing for more strategic flexibility.
Opportunities for Cooling
In political terms, despite the prevalent war propaganda, both Israel and Hezbollah are likely operating from a retreat line. Even Israel, currently perceiving itself in a position of strength, may return to this retreat line, particularly with the near-completion (90%) of understandings within the framework of American mediator Amos Hochstein's negotiations.
Militarily, Hezbollah continues to hold Israel's northern front hostage with its missile arsenal. Israeli military estimates suggest that Hezbollah maintains a substantial stockpile, with the added advantage of an active supply line—a stark contrast to Hamas's situation in Gaza. It would be premature to underestimate Hezbollah's combat capabilities in this regard, even if they struggle to make significant advances deep into Israeli territory. However, these capabilities have become somewhat limited in the interim, as Israel strives to shift fire control from its northern front to southern Lebanon, while simultaneously encouraging Lebanese civilians to evacuate potential attack zones, mirroring the situation in northern Israel.
The challenge remains to think innovatively. Israel's strategy may primarily focus on leveraging Iran's desire for a U.S. deal to weaken Hezbollah. In the future, Israel could potentially rely on the U.S. administration to thwart any prospective agreement with Tehran, or conversely, pressure Iran into a confrontation, thereby derailing any deal unfavorable to Israel until the war concludes and attention shifts to the nuclear file.
Conversely, should Hezbollah seek to de-escalate, it may explore other cooling opportunities. These could include redirecting attention to Lebanon's internal affairs by addressing political crises, such as the presidential vacuum, or engaging with the U.S. envoy's initiatives.
It is crucial to note that we are still in a critical exploratory phase between Israel and Hezbollah. Therefore, the primary question should not be whether this is a war phase or not, as it fundamentally remains a state of war, regardless of how it is described.
